# Round 3 – ASU RV vs. Bard LT (Aff)

## Case

### Natives

#### The alternative by itself fails – the USFG will exploit tribal sovereignty to dump waste.

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[Valerie, The Tainted Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West, pg. 95-96, RSR]

When people say that nuclearism is the “price we pay for freedom”, they usually omit the fact that this price is paid by those with disproportionately less power. Though poor communities often pay the highest price, more privileged Americans are not exempt from some kind of “payment”. Indeed, given that we are contemplating materials that transgress the social demarcations of borders and boundaries, it sometimes seems superfluous to talk about maps at all. Admittedly, there is irony in mapping a nuclear sacrifice zone when nuclear pollution tends to make boundaries obsolete. Even so, as we have seen with the uranium mining district, as well as the nuclear testing ranges, identifiable zones of concentration of nuclear activity exist that are substantively different from other regions. Likewise, some regions and people are actively targeted for nuclear waste disposal. As Grace Thorpe, tribal judge and health commission for Sauk and Fox Nation of Oklahoma, put it: The U.S. government targeted Native Americans [for nuclear waste disposal] for several reasons: their lands are some of the most isolated in North America, they are some of the most impoverished and, consequently, most politically vulnerable and, perhaps most important, tribal sovereignty can be used to bypass state environmental laws. How ironic that, after centuries attempting to destroy it, the U.S. government is suddenly interested in promoting Native American sovereignty – just to dump its lethal garbage…[and] and serve as hosts for the nation’s nuclear garbage dump.” The only two potential national, deep-geologic, high-level, and military waste sites in the United States are on or near traditional Indian lands; all recent proposals for temporary nuclear waste storage sites are for Indian reservations; and the nation’s new premiere “low-level” nuclear dump site also borders native communities on traditional native lands. The U.S. government has offered (through the office of the U.S. Nuclear Negotiator) often destitute Native communities substantial sums of money to consider waste-storage possibilities. As noted by Indian environmental activist Winona LaDuke: Indian reservations, which constitute [only] four percent of US lands, hold vast supplies of uranium, coal and timber. These vast, isolated lands are also attractive to industries searching for disposal sites for nuclear waste. In the past four years, more than 100 separate proposals have been made by government and industry to dump waste on Indian lands. To date, Indians have received 16 of the 18 “nuclear waste research grants” issued by the US Department of Energy…[I]n 1987, CERT (Council of Energy Resource Tribes) received $2.5 million from federal nuclear waste contracts – more than half the organization’s total income. In 1992, CERT received $1.2 million in federal grants for nuclear waste programs – 80% of the group’s federal grants.

#### The plan specifically key to reconcile claims to justice and find specific solutions—blanket rejection of state engagement shut out voices from the conversation

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[Mei-Fang, “Environmental Justice and Nuclear Waste Conflicts in Taiwan,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 417 – 434, June]

It is necessary to rethink the multiple conceptions of environmental justice articulated by the Yami and Taiwanese groups. This section focuses on the questions of how we might respond to differing ways of understanding environmental justice, deal with the divisions within a multicultural society and **formulate environmental policy** regarding nuclear waste dilemmas. The Yami professional and teenage student groups tended to stress the preservation of a liveable environment for future generations and regarded it as the core element of the environmental justice movement and the basis for the Yami’s opposition to nuclear waste. Instead, for most of the Taiwanese participants, the Yami’s anti-nuclear movement did not exactly correspond to the claims of environmental justice. Those Taiwanese participants who hold utilitarian views considered that the Yami anti-nuclear waste movement involved political consideration, self-interest and the attempt to obtain benefits or celebrity. The gap between the Yami and Taiwanese groups and the lack of mutual understanding and communication between them are significant. The Yami groups expressed their doubts as to whether the Taiwanese people would treat the tribesmen sincerely as partners in dealing with environmental problems, while the Taiwanese participants seemed to view the Yami as insular. A growing number of environmental ethicists have tried to rethink the problem of what practical effect environmental ethics has had on the formation of environmental policy. Contrary to a monistic approach, moral pluralism as a practical philosophy allows a form of agreement on real cases in which agreement on the general formulation of moral principles is not essential. Practical philosophy seeks the integration of multiple values and tries to reduce the distance between disputants by finding a general policy direction that can achieve greater consensus. It searches for workable solutions to specific problems or a range of actions that are morally permissible or acceptable to a wide range of worldviews (Norton, 1995: 129– 33). The multiple conceptions of environmental justice articulated by the Yami and Taiwanese groups in the context of nuclear waste controversies provide support for a pluralistic account of environmental values rather than a monistic philosophical stance. A foundational approach to ethics that requires the application of a single theory **functionally equivalent to truth** fails to take a variety of conflicting moral insights into account and limits alternatives to nuclear waste management. In contrast, pragmatism represents an engagement with the actual problems in the specific historical and social context. Environmental pragmatism draws upon the pragmatist philosophical and political tradition in American thought, advocating a serious inquiry into the practical merits of moral pluralism (Light & Katz, 1996). The American philosophical school, represented mainly in the late 19th- and early 20thcentury writings of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey is marked most notably by its anti-foundational character that denies the existence of ‘a priori or self-justifying ‘‘truths’’ and moral absolutes’ (Minteer & Manning, 1999: 193). For Light (1996), there is much that we do agree on that has not been put into environmental policy or communicated to the public effectively. From the metaphilosophical perspective, what environmental pragmatists agree on is that the truth of any particular theoretical framework is not always fundamental for specific environmental problems and the ‘appropriateness of any one theory in a particular case is contingent on historical, cultural, social and resource conditions’. Environmental pragmatism chooses the approach that is most appropriate for purposes of environmental practice regardless of its theoretical origin (Light, 1996: 172, 177). Considering the multiple values held by the Yami and Taiwanese groups in the nuclear waste disputes, abstract moral norms provided by environmental ethicists do not appear to resolve the practical problems faced by the local residents on Orchid Island. **Instead of asking environmental ethicists to give up** their **debates** **about** non-anthropocentric natural **value**, environmental pragmatism endorses a pluralism that acknowledges the possible necessity of sometimes using the anthropocentric description of the value of nature to help support a morally responsible policy (Light, 2004). Furthermore, the pragmatists admit that our understandings and concepts are fallible, and that experience can at any time reveal our beliefs or the meaning of an idea as false. Environmental pragmatism recognises the importance of many diverse individuals, experiences and concepts coming together to offer insights into actual problems in the public sphere (Parker, 1996). A growing body of research has demonstrated the validity of a pragmatic approach to specific environmental and social issues, including the cases of policymaking for leaded gasoline (Thomson, 2003), forest resource management (Castle, 1996), animal welfare and hunting (Light, 2004). Environmental pragmatism, representing a democratic respect for diverse public values and ethical positions regarding the environment, is relevant to the multiple understandings of environmental justice.

## Heidegger

#### Their infatuation with ontology is politically debilitating – focusing on ontology divests politics of its emancipatory potential and devolves into a self-justifying cycle of never-ending critique.

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[Majid, “Arendt's Heideggerianism: Contours of a `Postmetaphysical' Political Theory?,” Cultural Values, Volume 4, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Complete]

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.[21]

#### Case outweighs: We have a moral obligation to stop warming---any alternative results in extinction.

Baker 12 (7/25/12, Suzy, Executive Director of PopAtomic Studios, the Nuclear Literacy Project , Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: We Need to Talk, ansnuclearcafe.org/2012/07/25/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy-we-need-to-talk/)

Ocean Acidification¶ While I was making artistic monuments to single celled organisms in the ceramics studio, new research was emerging about ocean acidification affecting these beautiful and integral pieces of our ecosystem. As the ocean absorbs excess carbon from humans burning fossil fuels, the pH of the ocean is rapidly changing. This means that our ancient oxygen-making pals cannot properly do their job. As their ocean home becomes inhospitable, they are dying off in droves. This not only impacts the ocean’s ability to naturally sequester man made carbon emissions; it also negatively impacts the entire food chain, since they are the primary food source for other multi-cellular ocean creatures, some of which we enjoy eating.¶ Oh, and did I mention that these little phytoplankton are also responsible for creating the ozone layer that protects all life on the planet from cosmic radiation, and they churn out 70-80% of the oxygen we breathe? These creatures are much more than just a pretty floating form.¶ Ocean acidification is the issue that brought me to supporting nuclear energy. Ocean acidification is an often-overlooked aspect of climate change that is potentially more threatening than the heat, the super storms, the fires, the drought, the crop losses, and all of the other trends that we are seeing now, which climate scientists have been warning us about for decades.¶ Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: Like Oil and Water?¶ It didn’t take long for me to find out that in the nuclear industry, climate change is not something we all agree on. Discussing climate change as a concern is often polarizing, and brings up intrinsic conflicts of interest in the larger energy sector (the companies who design/build/run the nuclear plants also happen to design/build/run the fossil fuel plants). I’ve been advised by people who deeply care about me, and the success of my organization, not to bring up climate at all, and to be extremely careful not to base my support of nuclear on climate issues. I’ve also been specifically advised not to make the argument that nuclear energy is the only solution to climate change.¶ When you are the new kid, it is usually best not to make waves if you can help it. So, for the most part, I have heeded that advice and held my tongue, despite myself.¶ However, as I watch the news (and my wilting vegetable garden) and see the magnitude of human suffering that is directly related to increasingly severe weather events, I cannot keep silent. Climate change is why I am here supporting nuclear energy, so what am I doing not talking about it?¶ The CEO of Exxon Mobile recently made clear that despite his company’s acknowledgement of the irrefutable evidence of climate change, and the huge ecological and human cost, he has no intentions of slowing our fossil fuel consumption. In fact, he goes as far to say that getting fossil fuels to developing nations will save millions of lives. While I agree that we need stronger, better energy infrastructure for our world’s poorest nations, I wholly disagree that fossils are the right fit for the job.¶ Fossil fuel usage could be cast as a human rights issue only to the extent that access to reliable and affordable electricity determines what one’s standard of living is. At the same time, fossil fuel usage is the single largest threat to our planet and every species on it. Disregarding the impacts that fossil fuel use poses, merely to protect and increase financial profits, is unethical, and cloaking fossil fuel use as a human rights issue is immoral.¶ Although we are all entitled to our own opinions and beliefs, the idea that climate change and ocean acidification are even up for debate is not reasonable. Just think: The CEO of the largest fossil fuel company in America freely speaks out about climate change, while nuclear energy advocates are pressured to stay silent on the subject.¶ Silence is No Longer an Option¶ I am someone who avoids conflict, who seeks consensus in my personal and professional lives, and so I have followed the advice of well-meaning mentors and stayed silent in hopes of preserving a false peace within my pro-nuclear circles, including my family and friends. But my keeping silent is now over— starting here and starting now—because this is too big and too important to stay silent. I am not alone in believing this, and the nuclear industry does itself no favors by tacitly excluding the growing movement of people who are passionate about the need to use nuclear energy to address climate change.¶ And nuclear power is the only realistic solution. It would be great if there were also other viable solutions that could be easily and quickly embraced; however, the numbers just don’t work out. Renewables and conservation may have done more good if we had utilized them on a large scale 40 years ago, when we were warned that our ecosystem was showing signs of damage from fossils fuels…but at this point it’s really too late for them. And burning more fossil fuels right now, when we have the technologies and know-how to create a carbon-free energy economy, would be the height of foolishness.¶ In the meantime, there is real human suffering, and we here in the developed world are directly causing it. Our poorest brothers and sisters cannot escape the heat. They cannot import food when their crops fail. They cannot buy bottled water when there is a drought. They cannot “engineer a solution” any more than my childhood friends the phytoplankton can.¶ ¶ Energy Choices as an Ethical Obligation¶ We have an ethical obligation to stop killing people with our energy consumption. That statement may sound oversimplified, but let’s be honest—we know that fossil fuels kill approximately 1.3 million people each year through respiratory diseases and cancers, and the death toll for climate change related events rises every day. Yet, we do nothing but dither about climate change politics. Where is the outrage?¶ The fossil fuel industry has been successful at presenting a united front and maintaining consistent strategic communications. In contrast, the safety record and clean energy contributions of nuclear are always overshadowed by politics favoring fossil fuel use. If anything, nuclear advocates should be particularly sensitive that the very same politics are happening with climate science.¶ We should be championing nuclear energy as a science-based solution, instead of enforcing a meek code of silence. People from outside the nuclear industry, like Gwyneth Cravens, Barry Brooks and Tom Blees, have pointed out these relationships, yet the nuclear industry has yet to internalize and accept these realities.¶ How can we expect people to listen to science and not politics when it comes to nuclear energy, but not climate change?¶ Disagreeing with a policy does not change the facts. You can disagree with policy to limit carbon emissions, but that doesn’t change the fact that our fossil fuel consumption is changing the PH of our oceans. Many people disagree with the use of nuclear energy, but that doesn’t change the fact that nuclear is our largest source of carbon free electricity and the safest source of electricity per kilowatt hour.¶ Nuclear Must Lead by Example¶ If we want the public to overcome the cognitive dissonance between science and policy when it comes to nuclear energy, we need to lead by example and overcome our own cognitive dissonance when it comes to climate change — even if it means risking our own interests as members of the larger energy industry. We are not going to run out of fossil fuels any time soon, so the decision to move to carbon-free energy—to move to nuclear energy—must be made willingly, and based on ethical principles, not the limits of our natural resources.¶ As green groups wait endlessly for renewable technologies to have some kind of breakthrough, and nuclear supporters stay mum on climate change, we continue using fossil fuels. Our collective inaction is allowing the destruction of our planet’s ecosystem, the dying of our oceans, and the suffering of the poorest members of our own species. The climate conversation has become so convoluted by politics and greed that many smart, compassionate people have “thrown in the towel.” We should be more concerned than ever at our lack of a comprehensive global response.¶ I strongly believe that there’s still time to reclaim the dialogue about climate change based on ocean acidification evidence, and to use nuclear technologies to improve the long-term outcome for our planet and our species. The first step is acknowledging the complicated and unique role of the nuclear industry in this conflict, and the conflicts of interest that are impeding open communication. The second step is to realize that the climate change community is a potential ally, and that openly addressing the subject of climate change in our communications is in the best interest of the nuclear community. The third step is choosing to do the right thing, not just the polite thing, and reclaim our legitimate role in the energy community as the “top dog” of carbon-free electricity, instead of quietly watching natural gas become “the new coal.”¶ Climate change is not going away—it is getting worse—and each one of us in the nuclear community has an ethical obligation to speak up and to do something about it. I am speaking up for the oceans, for the cyano-bacteria and diatoms and our shared mitochondrial RNA that still fills me with wonder at the beauty of this world. Please join me if you can, to speak up for what you love—and if you cannot, please understand that we all remain nuclear advocates, and that the nuclear community is much stronger with the no-longer-silent climate change harbingers in it.

#### Case comes first – the scientific method of the 1AC is the most objective way of letting being manifest itself to us.

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[David, “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 307-337, RSR]

One of my intentions in this article is to show how the technical practices of science have constructed the problem of global warming for us in materially and politically significant ways. This goal requires some discussion of the philosophical implications of such a constructionist argument. Demystifying scientific knowledge and demonstrating the social relations its construction involves does not necessarily imply disbelief in either that knowledge or the phenomena it represents. Given its vital role in helping to make sense of environmental problems such as climate change, there simply can be no question of doing without science. Rather, the challenge is how to understand and live with it better. In this regard, constructionist accounts of science are important but incomplete (Demeritt 1996). By calling attention to the social relations involved in producing scientific knowledge of the natural world, theories of social construction challenge empiricist, positivist, and realist epistemologies.4 The practical and political implications of this philosophical critique have not always been articulated clearly. Two principal difficulties have plagued debates about social construction. First, there is the contentious philosophical question of nature's ontological status and its implications for the objectivity and epistemological authority of scientific knowledge. Impressed by science's spectacular capacity to represent, simulate, and construct nature through such practices as computer modeling and genetic engineering, some social constructionists, following Baudrillard (1983), have posited the total eclipse of the real and the natural by the virtual and artificial within a new, hyper-real society of the simulacra (Woolgar 1988; Myers 1990; Doyle 1997). Proceeding from different theoretical traditions but arriving at many of these same polemical conclusions, many sociologists of science insist that nature and the environment are epiphenomenal and that scientific knowledge of them is entirely explicable by how they are socially constructed (Collins and Yearley 1992; Collins and Pinch 1993; Hess 1997). These theoretical moves have provoked a fierce backlash from critics, many of them practicing scientists, who condemn social constructionism as an irrational and relativist denial both of the truth of scientific knowledge and of the ontologically objective reality it faithfully represents (Gross and Levitt 1994; Sokal 1996; Gottfried and Wilson 1997). The ensuing debates about science and social construction-the so-called science wars (Ross 1996)have been marred by a widespread failure to recognize the different varieties of construction talk, the different objects to which they apply the construction metaphor, and thus the important differences between social construction as refutation of science's truth and as unmasking of the inevitable partiality of its formulation (Demeritt 2001a).5 This distinction, drawn from Mannheim (1952), is nicely explained by Ian Hacking (1998,1999). The first, Hacking argues, accepts the philosophical presumptions of scientific objectivity and seeks to falsify a particular scientific claim by showing how belief in its truth was mistakenly (and thus, by definition, socially) constructed. Hacking (1998, 63) notes that "[t]he ghost of Karl Popper is at work in this . . . denouncing bad science. That ghost is untainted by all-purpose constructionism." By contrast, he suggests, social construction as unmasking has metaphysical aims. By unmasking the heterogeneous and contingent social relations involved in the practice of science, this form of social construction is directed against "certain pictures of reality, truth, discovery, and necessity" and the scientistic "ideology of... pious reverence" for science these metaphysics produce (Hacking 1999, 60, 62; cf. 1998, 65). Although provisionally helpful, this distinction between social construction as refutation and as unmasking is also somewhat simplistic. For instance, Hacking (1998, 1999) vastly underestimates the degree to which social construction as unmasking can be political as well as philosophical in its aims. Indeed, it is the hotly contested politics of climate change that make philosophical questions of how the social construction and warranting of scientific knowledge should be understood so politically contentious. The second problem with social construction debates is a consequence of their heavily philosophical flavor. So much attention has focused on the philosophical question of whether science might be said to construct socially the nature it studies that little has been paid to the practical relations between science and society. How does the specific articulation of scientific knowledge and practice constitute "the social"? How, in turn, do scientific knowledges depend upon particular social relations? Hung up on the social construction of scientific knowledge and nature, the debate has tended to ignore these questions and take the character of society and human subjectivity for granted. This oversight has had two implications. First, it has served to reinstall, rather than deconstruct, the dominant binary oppositions-nature/ society, objective/subjective, science/politics-organizing the now sterile social construction debates. Second, it has meant that questions about the broad cultural politics of science and the role of such politics in reshaping society and what it means to be human have not always received the critical consideration they deserve. One way out of this dualistic dead end is to think about the mutual construction of nature, science, and society. Rather than taking these phenomena as given, this approach is concerned with how they are constructed through the specific and negotiated articulation of heterogeneous social actors. I call this variety of social constructionism "heterogeneous constructionism," to signal that the facts of nature are not given as such but emerge artifactually as the heterogeneously constructed result of contingent social practices (Demeritt 1998). Such heterogeneous constructionism is indebted to the work of Donna Haraway (1991,149-82; 1992, 1997) and the actornetwork theory of Bruno Latour (1987, 1999), among others (Bernstein 1983; Rouse 1987; Hayles 1991; Butler 1993; Pickering 1995; Escobar 1996; Sismondo 1996; Castree and Braun 1998). Notwithstanding important theoretical differences among them, what these proponents of heterogeneous constructionism share in common is the insight, drawn from the work of Martin Heidegger (1962, 1977), that nature and the other things-in-theworld are disclosed to us as objects through practical engagements that configure them in ways that are recognizable for us and transforming of us. Heterogeneous constructionism does not deny the ontological existence of the world, only that its apparent reality is never pregiven; "reality" is only ever realized as such through the configuration of practices that make existence manifest, throwing human subjects into a particular world of order and intelligibility. This Heideggerian insight is a difficult one. Heterogeneous constructionism is ontologically realist about entities, but epistemologically antirealist about theories (what we designate as "electrons" has an ontologically objective existence, but our conception and classification of it are socially contingent). Thus, heterogeneous constructionism bears some similarity to nominalism and the doctrine that concepts are merely linguistic constructions without any essential relationship to the class of material objects to which they refer (Loux 1998). However, heterogeneous constructionists depart from nominalists in their insistence that the process of construction is not just semantic but also practical and that it shapes the phenomena of human perception in ontologically significant ways. The crucial difference between such heterogeneous constructionism and an even stronger idealist, or neo-Kantian, constructionism that is antirealist about both theories and entities (what we designate as "electrons" has no independent ontological existence; it is only our belief in the existence of "electrons" that gives them any substance and constructs them, such as gender, as conventional and ontologically subjective social objects) is that heterogeneous constructionism calls into question the absolute and interlocking distinctions between knowing and being, subjects and objects, nature and society, that make it possible to imagine reality as something distinct from and prior to representation. Heterogeneous constructionism provides a way of acknowledging that the world "matters" without taking for granted either the particular configuration of its matter or the processes by which it may be realized for us. As Joseph Rouse (1987, 159-60) explains: Practices are not representations that can be understood abstractly. They are always ways of dealing with the world. The ontological kinds they make manifest are determinable only through our purposive interactions with things of those kinds, and thereby with the other things that surround us. And those other things are as essential to the existence of meaningful ontological possibilities as our practices are . . . [F]or there to be electrons, there must be such things as atoms, on the one hand, and cathode-ray tubes on the other. That is, there must be the things that they interact with and the equipment that enables us to interact with them. Another way to put this is that for there to be things of any particular kinds, there must be a world to which they belong. But the reality of that world is not a hypothesis to be demonstrated; it is the already given condition that makes possible any meaningful action at all, including posing and demonstrating hypotheses. In this Heideggerian sense (1962, 97-98), equipment is not simply an inert tool but also the interdependent languages, conceptual categories, and ways of being-inthe-world through which it becomes a tool-for something. Similarly, the "real" world is not independent of but inseparable from the particular constellation of social practices through which its form is enframed along with our own. For the heterogeneous constructionist, nature is artifactual and its understanding an active and ontologically transformative practice. The practical engagements understanding involves reshape the way subjects and objects are thrown together as beings-in-the-world. An example may help clarify what I mean. Consider "climate." Defined as the "average weather conditions of a region over a period," conventionally 30 years (Mayhew and Penny 1992, 37), "climate" is a statistical abstraction. The apparently matter-of-fact existence of what we recognize as the climate is an artifact of certain social practices and conventions that make it possible to construct this universal out of so many observed particulars (O'Connell 1993; Porter 1994). Whereas a nominalist might regard the "climate" as merely a linguistic construction that is instrumentally useful for designating a class of real phenomena, an idealist, neo-Kantian constructionist would go further by claiming that the atmospheric phenomena we call climate are themselves socially constructed (and therefore ontologically subjective) through our conventional belief in their existence. The heterogeneous constructionist denies the absolute distinctions between word and thing made by the nominalist and between nature and society by the idealist, neo-Kantian constructionist. For the heterogeneous constructionist, neither the idea of a "global climate" nor the phenomena that it designates are conceivable apart from the world-shaping network of social practices, standardized instruments, orbiting weather and communications satellites, and computer models through which they are made manifest. By unmasking the socially contingent relations of its appearance for us, heterogeneous constructionism neither questions the ontological existence of climate as such nor refutes our knowledge of it. Heterogeneous constructionism acknowledges the constitutive role of science in disclosing for us the reality of climate change without reducing that reality to some phantasmic science fiction. Thus, heterogeneous constructionism dispenses entirely with the dead-end debate over the truth of scientific representation and whether scientific knowledge corresponds to a pregiven, external, and therefore ontologically objective natural world. Instead, it calls attention to the consequences of scientific practices for ways of being-in-the-world. In the particular case of the global climate, the conditions of its scientific intelligibility are also deeply implicated in the emergence of more reflexive understandings of human nature and subjectivity. The computer models, satellites, and associated scientific practices that make the global climate manifest to us also help to position us as reflexive subjects with a specifically planetary consciousness of the earth's environment as a whole (Cosgrove 1994). No longer fatalistic in the face of incalculable climatic hazards, we feel increasingly able to predict those risks scientifically and therefore to fashion ever more of our individual biographies reflexively on the basis of knowledgeable choices about an open future (Beck 1992). In turn this reflexive subjectivity, with its decision-oriented belief in the possibility of managing life's contingency through rational choice, infuses the science of global climate change with some tacit beliefs about determinacy, prediction, and rational control.

#### Permutation do both: Heideggerian releasement is an affirmative argument: we can establish a free relation to technology through thinking, so the action of the plan is not implicated by their link.

Godzinski 5(Ronald Jr., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, “(En)Framing Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology,” Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1, humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html)

In a related vein, the previous claim that everything within the natural world gives itself over to us, as standing-reserve is, for Heidegger, a phenomenological claim. As a purely phenomenological claim, Heidegger is not making an evaluative assertion about the status of modern technology and our comportment toward things that are treated as standing-reserve. Perhaps following the regressive method that Husserl used in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Heidegger presents us with a purely descriptive account of modern technology that seems to be value neutral. In truth, he acknowledges that technology is not intrinsically dangerous or evil.[17](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#17) Even Heidegger’s infamous “Memorial Address”[18](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#18) supports this idea:¶ For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil.[19](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#19) ¶ When understood within this particular context, Heidegger is neither praising nor demonizing modern technology. Of course the same would have to be said about technological objects that were purported to be intrinsically good, as well. Hence, the potential value that any technical device might have would be contingent upon its context of use. From a Heideggerian standpoint, it would be inappropriate to claim that any technical device is intrinsically good or evil.[20](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#20) ¶ In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger makes the phenomenological observation that we master nature because we respond to nature’s call to requisition it. We do this primarily because this is how we have been *called* by Being. We use things as standing-reserve since they give themselves as standing-reserve—everything gives itself to be used. Even when we are not openly trying to master nature, Heidegger would nonetheless contend that we are still responding to its call. The revealing is not something that we do strictly on our own accord, without first hearing nature’s call. In this sense, we cannot be held accountable for modern technology, since this is something that just happens in the context of western culture: ¶ When man…reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment even when he contradicts it. Thus when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve. Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely human doing.[21](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#21) ¶ The challenge which directs us to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve, is nothing other than what Heidegger calls “enframing” [*Gestell*].[22](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#22) Enframing, or *Gestell*, is the essence of modern technology. From Heidegger’s perspective, enframing is the way in which truth reveals itself as standing-reserve. We simply cannot avoid its influence or sway. One is already in a relationship with it, so it is not a matter of whether or not I will respond to it. Rather, it is a matter of how I will respond to it. More importantly, our response to the challenge that enframing emits, is neither completely predetermined nor free.¶ Heidegger recognizes that an authentic notion of freedom will be open to the essencing of technology. Thus, a genuine and free relationship to technology will be one that is open to the essencing of technology. This type of openness to the presencing of technology is called Gelassenheit, or releasement:¶ We can use technical devices, and yet with the proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them at any time…. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature…. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old word, *releasement toward things*.[23](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#23) ¶ In the movement of Gelassenheit, one enters into a free relationship with technology which is not founded upon domination and mastery.[24](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#24) On the contrary, an authentic relationship to technology is one that is simply beyond our control.[25](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#25) Paradoxically, a relationship which is exemplified by releasement continually uses things as standing-reserve, while avoiding the danger of being taken as standing-reserve, although Heidegger certainly keeps a watchful eye out for the ultimate danger that rests within the ordering of standing-reserve. That is, if we, ourselves, get ordered or dominated by the things that we in turn are trying to order and dominate, then we will encounter the danger, to the extent that the sending or presencing of Being gets closed off and concealed from us.[26](http://www.humboldt.edu/%7Eessays/godzinski.html#26)

#### **Plan is a net benefit to the permutation.**

#### **a.) The very idea of housing in Yucca Mountain is the standing reserve mentality.**

Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, ‘5

[Brian and Theo (Centre for the Study of Technology and Organisation, Lancaster University Management School), “The secret of Yucca Mountain: reflections on an object in extremis”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2005, volume 23, page 741]

The Yucca Mountain project has been officially trumpeted as the long sought after solution to nuclear waste, but for many others in US society (and beyond) the repository has a very different meaning. If Heidegger (1977) bemoaned what the siting of a hydroelectric plant had done to the Rhine, the technological revealing of nature as standing reserve, the outcry over Yucca Mountain by various US native peoples is no less notable. Indeed, for them the repository implies an act not of purification but, rather, one of defilement. Yucca Mountain has ``long been a place of powerful spiritual energy for the Shoshone and the Paiute. The water in the area is sacred, too, as it is with many desert peoples'' (http://www.sacredland.org/endangered sites pages/ yucca mountain.html). Further, Erikson observes: ``Shoshone and Paiute natives \_ see that whole tract as part of an ancient claim and view its use by federal agencies as `willful trespass'. They have been using Yucca Mountain for at least twelve thousand years ... . The very idea of injecting the most virulent poisons ever known into the body of a mountain seems to them an insult to the earth, an affront to ancestors, and a violation of natural good sense'' (1994, pages 208 ^ 209). Clearly, then, the object Yucca Mountain as well as the idea of turning it into a repository for nuclear waste are perceived within a variety of interpretative horizons. Their meaning and value are formed in relation to a number of different historical, cultural, economic, and political contexts.

#### **b.) SQUO treats atomic energy as an standing reserve, concealing the problems with waste.**

Rawles, Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, 2k

[Richard, “Coyote Learns to Glow”, Part of “Learning to Glow: A Nuclear Reader”, RSR]

Humans, having gathered uranium from the New Mexican desert not all that far from Yucca Mountain, have harnessed the energy within the atom, for commercial and security purposes, in effect by “tricking" nature out of its secret power. We are aided in our industry by this supposedly "free” energy source. As Martin Heidegger observed, we regard the natural world as a “standing reserve:’ there for the plundering-the military metaphor is more than apt in this case. Having stolen from nature its hidden fire, we delude ourselves into believing that there’s no reckoning, no balancing of accounts, despite even the scientific evidence, which tells us there are no free meals in nature’s unforgiving cycles. We are burdened by the waste from this virtual cornucopia, much as the Greeks of the early classical period projected into Pandora's box of woes the burdens of civilizing fire—its destructive aspects, along with the rituals needed to maintain the fire.

#### The problem is not too much apocalyptic rhetoric in the SQUO rather a denial of science and that we are hurting the environment. We solve this and the K.

Latour ‘4 Bruno Latour, Professor and vice-president for research at Sciences Po Paris, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30, Winter 2004

In these most depressing of times, these are some of the issues I want to press, not to depress the reader but to press ahead, to redirect our meager capacities as fast as possible. To prove my point, I have, not exactly facts, but rather tiny cues, nagging doubts, disturbing telltale signs. What has become of critique, I wonder, when an editorial in the New York Times contains the following quote? Most scientists believe that [global] warming is caused largely by manmade pollutants that require strict regulation. Mr. Luntz [a Republican strategist] seems to acknowledge as much when he says that “the scientiﬁc debate is closing against us.” His advice, however, is to emphasize that the evidence is not complete. “Should the public come to believe that the scientiﬁc issues are settled,” he writes, “their views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientiﬁc certainty a primary issue.” 2

#### Rhetoric of apocalypse is not a link - key to producing substantive change and generating agency – studies prove

Veldman 12 (Robin Globus, phd candidate B.A and M.A, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” in Ethics & the Environment 17.1.)

As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 17(1) 2012 using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, humancaused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.

#### Totalistic anti-nuclear criticism destroys coalitions and the possibility of progressive social change.

Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, ‘93

[Sankaran, Alternatives, Summer, p. 400-401, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory”]

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities," while a "postmodern"President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other.Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal.It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti‑Gulf War movement.Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional on strategic essentialisms our attempts to create space for activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

#### Heidegger’s privileging of ontology is complicit in atrocities.

Committee on Public Safety 96 (The writers subsume their individual names within the denomination of "Committee" in deference to the indivisibility of the work presented Levinasian Scholars "My Place in the Sun" Reflections On The Thought Of Emmanuel Levinas Diacritics 26.1 (1996) 3-10 Project Muse) TBC 7/7/10

At the heart of Levinas's critique of Heidegger is the reproof that the question of man has become submerged in the question of being, and thus that the recovery of the meaning of being entails the forgetting of the meaning of the human. Heidegger's Letter on Humanism (Brief über den Humanismus), published in 1947, in which he claims that "what is essential is not humanity, but being" [Brief 24] is offset by the title of Levinas's work, published in the same year, in which he shows how the anonymity of existence, or being, is redeemed only by the existent, or be-ing; hence, De l'existence à l'existant, from existence to the existent--denoting a sense of direction, lost needlessly in Lingis's translation of the title as Existence and Existents. Levinas depicts the anonymity of being through the il y a, in which the impersonality of the verb mirrors the subjectless horror of existence. The anonymity of the il y a is "saved" ultimately only through the face of the other for whom one is always inescapably responsible. It is not that Levinas retreats from the ontological (the domain of Sein or being) to the ontic (the domain of the Seienden or be-ings), or that he rejects being in favor of some pre-Heideggerian idealist notion of the subject. Rather, his emphasis on the passage from the bare meaning of être or existence to l'étant or existent gropes toward what finally comes to signify the ethical, whereby the anonymity of the infinitive is overcome by the priority of the participial being-for-another-existent and the subject deposed rather than posed [EI 50]. "I am wary of that debased word 'love,'" he remarks again to Nemo, "but the responsibility for the other, being-for-the-other, seemed to me, even at that time [1947], to put an end to the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being" [EI 51]. Only in the most practical and mundane of obligations to the other is ontology rendered ethical and humane. This horror invoked by the anonymous il y a is not to be confused with Heideggerian anguish before death, or care for being. Levinas describes how the original De l'existence appeared in a cover on which were inscribed the words "where it is not a question of anxiety" [EI 47]. One could scarcely ask for a more explicit derangement of fundamental ontology, in the light of a horror of the il y a which had become historically incarnated for him: "None of the generosity which the German counterpart of the 'there is,' the 'es gibt,' is said to contain was displayed between 1933 and 1945," he writes later [DL 375]. There is no mistaking his imputation of ideological implications of complicity between Heideggerian Sein and modern genocide. They are related, not by happenstance but as the fundamental possibility of each other. Invoking the Platonic concept of the good beyond being (epekeina ts ousias), Levinas contests the notion that nothingness is a privation of being and that evil is a privation of the good, insisting that evil itself is a positive mode of being. Being can be more primally terrible than simply not-being. In brief, the distance between Heideggerian ontology and Levinasian ethics can be measured by the difference between an inquiry into being qua being (ti to on) and an inquiry into humanity itself (ti bioteon)--a distance which, as Heidegger himself observes in his Letter [Brief 22], is paradoxically both farther away than any individual be-ing and yet nearer than any be-ing could ever be.

#### The alternative only makes things worse by concealing what they are trying to release and reveal. This means their project fails

Wolin 90 (Richard, Professor of Modem European Intellectual History, THE POLITICS OF BEING, 1990 p. 119)

"Freedom for what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be," observes Heidegger, in an initial formulation of his later  philosophical doctrine of Gelassenheit or "releasement." This greater philosophical willingness (atype of philosophical Ent-schlossenheit or "un-closedness") to "let beings be the beings they are" presumably yields greater fidelity to the "Being of beings" as such. It thus represents a first significant step toward a solution to the Seinsfrage; whereas in the case of philosophical thoughtfrom Plato onward, the Being of beings was essentially covered up or concealed by the distortional influence of various philosophical "first principles": the "idea," the "cogito,""substance," "monad," "the transcendental subject," "spirit," etc. However (and what follows constitutes a crucial admission by Heidegger), insofar as letting beings be always lets beings be ina specific way - that is, because letting be is itself always perspectival or selective - its very manner or disclosing beings also conceals them. Thus, every act of unconcealment is simultaneously an act of concealment. Or as Heidegger himself expresses this thought: "Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them andthus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole."

#### Phenomenology fails – we can’t transcend purely empirical ideas

Bartok 84 (Philip J. Dept of Phil U of Notre Dame FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE AND THE “DEATH” OF PHENOMENOLOGY) TBC 7/8/10

Foucault’s line of argument here is most plausibly understood as an internal objection to Husserl’s approach: Transcendental phenomenology fails to achieve the (transcendental) aims set out for it by § Marked 14:25 § Husserl himself. The transcendental reduction fails insofar as it merely effects something like a shift of vision, attempting to assign transcendental significance to what are, by Husserl’s own admission, merely empirical contents. If Foucault’s archaeological analysis of the character of the modern episteme is adequate, this failure was inevitable given the fact that Husserl’s project was configured by an episteme characterized by the analytic of finitude. Given the problematic dual status of “man” under this episteme, Husserlian phenomenology cannot help but devolve into an anthropology.